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30.2 Firsts and lasts
A big tension, between the reality of God (as firsts) and the reality of everyday
nature (as lasts), was shown in Chapter 2 to have influenced
many philosophers to go to one side or the other. Using theistic science as a basis
for what kinds of connections between God and nature can be known, we see that most
of the philosophers discussed in Chapter 2 do not describe
those connections. Only Aquinas and Swedenborg
appear to make consistent and more-than-abstract arguments that go from God to material
nature, and from the material back again to God. Both of these systems place mind
within that connection, as in our theory.
I do not include Plotinus in this short list because of his
tendency towards non-dualism, wherein the natural world does not exist in the normal
sense of containing material objects. Descartes did not even
attempt to elucidate the connections between God and the world, in part because
he wanted to keep science separate from religion. Kant claimed
that we never know about those connections since they involve, he said, knowledge
of things in themselves beyond human reach.
Any theory that gives a unified account of first things with God and of last
things in nature will thereby be able to explain why creation is needed by God and
what it is that can be done by means of a created world that God cannot do immediately.
That particular explanation is missing from nearly all the metaphysical theories
that have been examined, but is clearly needed. It would be good to know why God
is so slow in creating planets, biological life, humans, and spirituality. Most
accounts of divine omnipotence imply that God can and will create all these things
immediately and moreover, if he is benevolent, heal them immediately if they are
flawed. Yet, this does not happen! Can you explain why not? In the light of this
book’s explanations of evolution and human development, only
something like Swedenborg’s account remains capable of giving
sufficient explanation.
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