30.5 Mental dualism

We have the incompleteness of physical laws not only from divine action, but also from actions of the mind. Since we have derived a fully-fledged account of mental substances that is completely non-reductive, those substances (that is, our own minds) must be able to influence the course of physical things. Within the multilevel generative structure that is deduced within theistic science, we certainly do not have physicalism, whether reductive or non-reductive. Neither do we have an emergence theory, since this is usually taken to be emergence from material brains. If, instead, we could consider emergence by creation or generation from God, then perhaps the name could be appropriate. We now have reasons for something like a transmission theory of consciousness, as James (1898) suggested. We begin to know where that consciousness comes from and its nature when it arrives, so a realistic and more accurate psychology may begin. Neither do we have a dual-aspect monism as James (1904) proposed, as followed by many from Russell (1921) to Polkinghorne (2005), since we do not have a monism in the first place but rather a multi-level reality that includes both God, minds and nature as well as the principles of their interconnections.